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The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception
in an Age of Modem Political Violence
Duane K. Thompson*
The United States is party to ninety-six extradition treaties,1 each of
which specifies that no obligation exists to extradite an individual for an
act that constitutes a political offense.2 Born of the experience of the
Enlightenment, 3 this doctrine has become known as the "political of-
fense" exception. The exception allows countries to remain neutral in
foreign conflicts, at least to the extent of declining to deliver participants
into the hands of their enemies.
The courts are charged with an initial determination of whether the
exception applies in particular cases. United States courts have not in-
quired into the legitimacy of the foreign government requesting extradi-
tion.4 They have, instead, sought to determine whether the individual's
* J.D., Yale University.
1. International extradition is defined as the act by which one nation surrenders an individ-
ual who is present within its territory to another nation that has charged or convicted the
individual for the commission of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction. The duty to extra-
dite only arises pursuant to express treaty provisions. J.B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON ExTRADi-
TION AND INTERSTATE RENDmON 3-5 (1891).
For a list of the 96 nations which are parties to bilateral extradition treaties with the United
States, see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982).
2. The standard formulation of a political offense exception is exemplified in the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, which provides:
Extradition shall not be granted if.
(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one
of a political character; or (ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition
has in fact been made with a view to try to punish him for an offense of a political
character.
Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art. 5, see. 1, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
3. See, e.g., J. LIVELY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1966). Before the development of the
political offense exception, the primary purpose of extradition had been to facilitate the appre-
hension and punishment of political dissidents. Medieval overlords used extradition more as a
device to retrieve their political enemies than as a means to bring ordinary criminals to jusiice.
Enlightenment thinking and the revolutionary upheaval of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries were significant factors leading to change in the doctrine and practice of extradition.
Emergence of constitutional government from the American and French revolutions broad-
ened concern for individual liberty and tolerance of rebellion against unjust regimes. States
thereafter began to recognize a duty to grant asylum to political dissidents. Thus, by the nine-
teenth century, the international community had renounced extradition as a permissible means
to suppress political opposition. See generally, Sutherland, The Development of International
Law of Extradition, 28 ST. LouIs U. L. J. 33-35 (1984).
4. Indeed, such an inquiry would be patently beyond the legitimate scope of judicial in-
quiry and could be assessed, if at all, only by the executive branch of the United States govern-
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commission of a violent act is related to a larger pattern of political con-
flict. This mode of inquiry has become known as the "incidence test."
The major problem in relying on this incidence test grows out of
changes in the nature of political violence. First, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in the incidence of violent opposition. This increase in vio-
lence is exacerbated in international terms by enhanced mobility enabling
more opposition forces to reach foreign jurisdictions.5
Second, the nature of opposition activity has changed. Violent opposi-
tion is now as likely to focus on non-governmental as governmental
targets. Not only government officials but also landowners, business lead-
ers, and often ordinary citizens become the targets of political violence.
This violence may be conducted outside the borders of the nation against
representatives of either a regime or a social order. Generally referred to
as terrorism, 6 this type of violence differs from the historical pattern of
"rebellion" on which the jurisprudence of the political offense exception
is based. The incidence test, however, has failed to meet this change in
the pattern of political action by not providing a workable distinction
between terrorism and political rebellion.
In tracing this ambiguity in the law, this Article traces the historical
development of the political offense exception, showing how this interna-
tional norm has been applied in different national jurisdictions. Con-
trasts among British, Swiss, and French law are made and each is
compared with the United States version of the political offense excep-
tion. This Article argues that the ambiguous distinction between rebel-
lion and terrorism has complicated the application of the political offense
exception. As a result, a fundamental tension exists between the goals of
ment. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963); First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) reh'g denied 409 U.S. 897 (1973).
5. See, eg., Lauter, There's No Place to Hide: Extraditions Have Tripled, and It's Only the
Beginning, 7 NAT'L L. J. 1, col. I (Nov. 26, 1984).
6. There is no standard definition of "terrorism," and the various formulations are subjects
of intense controversy. See, eg., Lubet and Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the
Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, n. 17 (1980). Some
commentators have suggested that the definition is inherently circular. See, e.g.,
Schwarzenberger, Terrorists, Guerrillas, and Mercenaries, TOLEDO L. Rlv. 71, 72 (1971). As
used in this article, terrorism refers to violence against private individuals and groups not
directly responsible for the actions of the government. This definition does not preclude treat-
ing acts of governments as terrorism against their own citizens. See, e.g., U.N. Rep't of the Ad
Hoe Comm. on Int'l Terrorism, G.A.O.R. 28th Sess. Supp. 28 [A-9028] at p.15.
One definition of terrorism notes that there are three characteristics of terrorism: a violent,
criminal act; toward an impersonal target; with a motive of striking widespread fear (terror)
within the community. One must distinguish whether the "nationalistic struggle for self deter-
mination and revolutionary theory" is a spur to the acts or a rationalization for them. NAT'L





preserving neutrality in foreign conflicts and of deterring transnational
terrorism. This Article proposes a new functional test to modernize the
incidence test. This new test reconciles neutrality and anti-terrorist goals
in a manner consistent with the courts' refusal to inquire into the legiti-
macy of the foreign government requesting extradition.
I. Overview of the Political Offense Exception
The political offense exception removes the obligation to extradite
when the actions for which the individual is being charged are part of a
course of conduct associated with general political offenses such as trea-
son, sedition, or espionage. Although the specific actions charged may be
criminal offenses such as murder or arson, they are rendered political by
virtue of the context in which they occur.
In analyzing the context of the action, courts have recognized both
"pure" and "relative" political offenses.7 The distinction, which has
never been absolute, is based on consideration of the target and the
means used. A pure political offense is defined largely in terms of its
target - government officials or the regime of official power. The relative
political offense has elements of a common crime, perpetrated in a polit-
ical context, and may be directed at non-governmental as well as govern-
mental targets.
The relative political offense exception raises the problem of defining
"political." The courts are now confronted with a virtually unbounded
concept of the political as individuals or groups use violent means against
a wide range of targets to serve political ends. The theory of the political
offense exception has not yet adequately incorporated these changes in
targets and means.
A completely unbounded concept of the political offense would de-
stroy the system of international extradition. The challenge is to develop
a standard that distinguishes between contemporary political action and
terrorism. Courts have tended to base this distinction on unspecified as-
sumptions which imply that factors of political expedience or other stan-
dards are taken into account. As a result, the goal of neutrality has been
undermined by according primacy to the goal of preventing terrorism.
The danger in this approach is that the concept of terrorism will become
so expansive that it becomes merely a code word for actions that are
inconsistent with the momentary foreign policy positions of the state act-
ing on the request for extradition. The political offense exception would
7. See Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders": The Political Offense Exception
to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 178 (1984).
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no longer serve to preserve international neutrality and to protect indi-
vidual rights, but would instead become merely one more foreign policy
tool in the hands of governments.
II. Origin of the Incidence Test in the English Common Law
The British approach to the political offense exception can be traced to
In re Castioni.8 That case involved the Swiss government's extradition
request for Angelo Castioni, a Swiss national accused of fatally shooting
a government official. Castioni admitted the shooting but claimed exemp-
tion under the Extradition -Act of 1870, 9 which forbade extradition for
acts of a "political character" while leaving the term undefined.10 The
shooting had occurred during a political disturbance in the canton of
Ticino. Citizens in the town of Bellizona had for some time been dissatis-
fied with the political party controlling the government. They revolted
when that party refused to revise the Ticino constitution upon the peti-
tion of 7000 citizens as required by that constitution. The townspeople
seized the local arsenal and stormed the town palace. Castioni was
among the first to enter; he shot a government official who had offered no
active resistance.
The Queens Bench found that Castioni had committed an offense of a
political character. In reaching its decision, the court adopted the "inci-
dence test." The test requires that an act be perpetrated in the course of
and in furtherance of a widespread political uprising;" hence, the test
requires that a court inquire into the circumstances surrounding an of-
fense.12 Though perhaps inconsistent with the outcome of the case, the
court emphasized that an act satisfies the test only when it is in further-
ance of a political uprising rather than merely incidental thereto. 13
8. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
9. Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
10. The Extradition Act of 1870 provides in relevant part:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense to which he is surrendered or
demanded is one of a political character or if he proves to the satisfaction of the police
magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on habeas corpus, or to the Secretary
of State that the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try to
punish him for an offense of a political character.
Id
11. Castioni, at 156.
12. Id at 155 (Dennan, J.):
[I]t is [not] necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language the shape
of an exhaustive definition exactly the whole state of things or every state of things which
might bring a particular case within the description of an offense of a political character.
13. Id at 155, 165. Justices Dennan and Hawkins explicitly rejected an interpretation of
the Extradition Act of 1870 proposed by John Stuart Mill implying that any act occurring
during a political uprising may be a political offense irrespective of the perpetrator's object and
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The Queen's Bench elaborated on the incidence test in In re Meunier.14
Meunier was an avowed anarchist sought by the French government for
the bombings of a Parisian cafe and a military barracks. Two people
were killed in the cafe attack. Meunier challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence linking him with the cafe bombing and asserted that the bomb-
ing of the military barracks was an offense of a political character under
the Extradition Act of 1870.15 Justice Cave rejected Meunier's assertion
and declared that the incidence test requires the existence a political up-
rising in which two or more factions vie for control of the government.
Accordingly, random violence of the type used by an anarchist could
never constitute a political offense since it does not further the interests
of a faction. 16
Together, Castioni and Meunier delimit the political offense exception
where violence has been committed with a political purpose. The Extra-
dition Act, however, also disallows extradition when the request is made
"with a view of trying or punishing them for an offense of a political
character."
In Ex parte Kolczynski17 the Queen's Bench interpreted this to author-
ize the courts to inquire into the motive of a state requesting extradition.
Kolczynski involved the seizure of a Polish fishing trawler by a group of
its crewmembers. The vessel had been part of the Polish fishing fleet in
the North Atlantic on which a party secretary "was stationed to moni-
tor loyalty." Some of the crew members believed that upon return to
Poland, they would become victims of political persecution. After a mu-
tiny in which no serious injuries occurred, these crew members diverted
the trawler to Britain. Polish authorities demanded extradition, charging
the crew members with common, non-political crimes analogous to mu-
intention. The term "incidence test" thus may be somewhat misleading. It derives from an
earlier interpretation of the Extradition Act by Justice Stephen, the third Castioni judge:
[Tihe expression in the Extradition Act ought (unless some better interpretation of it can
be suggested) to be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered
for extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political
disturbances.
2 J. STEPHEN, HIsToRY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 70-71 (1883).
14. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
15. Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
16. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419. Justice Cave explained:
inhere must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government
of their own choice on the other in pursuance of that object, it is a political offense,
otherwise not. In the present case there are not two parties in the State, each seeking to
impose the Government of their own choice on the other; for the party with whom the
accused is identified. . . the party of anarchy, is the enemy of all Governments. Their
efforts are directed primarily against the general body of citizens.
17. Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
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tiny and kidnapping.' 8
Britain refused extradition. The accused seamen were allowed to intro-
duce evidence suggesting that they would, in fact, be punished for trea-
son if returned to Poland. On writ of habeas corpus, the Queen's Bench
found this evidence sufficient to establish that Poland's motive was to
punish the accused for offenses of a political character; thus the court
found that the Extradition Act required nonextradition. The Justices of
the Queen's Bench justified the denial of extradition because Poland in-
tended to try the accused for treason rather than for the common crimes
upon which it had based its request. 19
Kolczynski illustrates the impossibility of applying the political offense
exception without considering the motives of the government requesting
extradition. It also foreshadows the difficulty of preserving both the sys-
tem of extradition and the political offense exception as the concept of
political action expands beyond rebellion of the types covered in Castioni.
As Meunier illustrated, once the action moves beyond this classic exam-
ple of political opposition to the government, the courts are left with
little to guide them in their attempts to define political actions that justify
a principled refusal to grant a request for extradition.
III. The Predominant Political Motivation Test in Swiss Law
Swiss courts have taken a comparatively sophisticated approach to the
determination of whether an act constitutes a political offense. The
"political motivation" test looks into the subjective motivation of the ac-
cused and mandates nonextradition for political motivation when two
conditions are satisfied. First, the act for which extradition is sought
must have been directly related to furthering a goal of a political move-
18. Id at 543. The precise allegations were: use of force, depriving the captain and other
crew members of their freedom, wounding the party secretary, damaging the ship radio,
preventing the captain from commanding the ship, and exposing the ship and crew to the
danger of calamity at sea.
19. Issues such as whether the accused will receive a fair trial in the country demanding
extradition and whether the accused will be tried for offenses other than those for which he has
been found to be extraditable have consistently been labelled "humanitarian considerations"
which only the State Department has competence to consider. See, eg., Neely v. Henkel, 180
U.S. 109 (1901); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), affid per curiam 241 U.S. 651
(1916); In re Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. 717, 722-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Dicta in recent cases, however, suggest that repudiation of the "rule of noninquiry" is possi-
ble in extraordinary cases. See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960) cert. denied,
364 U.S. 851 (1960) ("We can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be
subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to
require reexamination of the principle."); Cf also Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.
1980) (Prisoners convicted of crime in Mexico and serving out sentences in the United States
pursuant to Mexican-American Treaty on Execution of Penal Sentences had right to challenge




ment. Second, the "predominance theory," requires that the political ele-
ment of an act be greater than the common crime element so that
unnecessary injury or cruelty is avoided.
This Swiss approach was established in In re Ockert.20 That case in-
volved the German government's extradition demand for a German na-
tional whom it accused of having murdered a member of the National-
Socialist (Nazi) party. At the time of the incident in question, Ockert had
been active in the Reichsbanner, the paramilitary arm of the Social-Dem-
ocratic Party that opposed Nazi dogma. Ockert had, indeed, shot a Nazi
during the course of a street clash between members of their respective
parties.
The Federal Tribunal found that Ockert's political motivation placed
the act under the political offense exception of the Swiss international
extradition statute.21 The Federal Tribunal's opinion did not consider
whether the shooting was significantly related to the objectives of the
Social-Democratic Party. Thus, Ockert is silent as to the limits of the
applicability of the political offense exception to acts motivated by sub-
jective political beliefs. 22 Such limits had, however, been set forth in an
earlier decision.
In In re Kaphengst,23 the Federal Tribunal acceded to the German
government's demand for a German national who was charged with ex-
ploding a series of bombs at public sites and injuring several civilians.
Though Kaphengst's motivation was political, he was not associated with
a political movement. Noting this, the Federal Tribunal held that the
political offense exception applies only to acts that are proximately re-
lated to an organized attempt to overthrow a government. Random acts
of violence would never further such an objective, and therefore fall
outside of the exception.24
A similar limitation of Ockert may be drawn from the Wassiief25 case.
There the Federal Tribunal decided that acts that are unnecessary or out
of proportion to a political objective cannot constitute political offenses.
Even assuming that the political motivation of the accused is to further
20. 59 BG 1136; 7 Ann. Dig. 369 (Switzerland, Fed. Tribunal) (1933).
21. Swiss-German Extradition Treaty of 1874, Art. I(I); Id. at 369.
22. See Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226 (1962).
23. 56 BG 1 457; 5 Ann. Dig. 292 (Switzerland, Fed. Tribunal) (1930).
24. Id. at 293-94. The court stated:
The practice of the Federal Court in regard to extradition showed that the Court al-
ways refused to attribute the character of a political offense to purely terroristic acts
which were not mere episodes in the course of an action aiming at an immediate over-
throw of the state.
25. Decided April 13, 1908, reported in [1909] FOR. REL.U.S. 519 (1914).
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the cause of a political movement that seeks to control the state, the Tri-
bunal found that a violent act is not automatically a political offense. In
effect, this approach affords the Swiss judiciary wide discretion to inquire
into the relevant circumstances of a case.
In re Kavic,26 for example, rejected the Yugoslavian government's ex-
tradition demand for Yugoslavian nationals who had hijacked a plane to
Switzerland despite the absence of past political activity on the part of
the accused or of any widespread political insurrection in Yugoslavia.
The Federal Tribunal found that, in light of the totalitarian nature of
Yugoslavia, the political element of the hijacking predominated over the
common crime element. 27
Cases like Kaphengst and Kavic illustrate that political offense juris-
prudence cannot rest solely, or even principally, on an appraisal of sub-
jective motivation. Kaphengst's approach to terrorism is strikingly
similar to that taken by the British court in Meunier;28 neither court will
invoke the political offense exception in cases where the link between the
political motivation and the target of violence is tenuous, or where the
political motivation itself is ill-defined or unrelated to a struggle for polit-
ical power.
To the extent that the predominance approach requires careful scru-
tiny of the circumstances surrounding political violence, it permits recon-
ciliation of all the interests raised by the political offense exception. Yet,
unless courts develop criteria for determining whether a political conflict
exists, the Swiss approach could become ad hoc and discretionary,
thereby making it more a political tool of foreign policy than a judicial
standard for balancing the interests involved in the political offense
exception.
IV. The Incidence Test in American Law
The American approach corresponds in key respects to the British ap-
proach. American courts have adopted the incidence test in determining
whether an alleged crime actually constitutes a political offense. How-
26. 78 ATF I 39; 19 Ann. Dig. 371 (Switzerland, Fed. Tribunal) (1952).
27. 19 Ann. Dig. supra note 26, at 374. The court stated:
The relation between the purpose and the means adopted for its achievement must be
such that the ideals connected with the purpose are sufficiently strong to excuse, if not
justify, the injury to private property, and to make the offender appear worthy of asy-
lum.. .. Freedom from the constraint of a totalitarian State must be regarded as an
ideal in this sense. In the present case the required relationship undoubtedly exists; for, on
the one hand, the offences against the other members of the crew were not very serious,
and, on the other, the political freedom and even existence of the accused was at stake,
and could only be achieved through the commision of these offences.




ever, unlike the British courts, American courts have refused to consider
the motives of a state requesting extradition.
The incidence test was first applied by an American court in the case
of In re Ezeta.29 That case involved the Republic of Salvador's extradi-
tion request for its former President, Antonio Ezeta, and four former
military officers. Salvador accused these men of having committed mur-
der, robbery, and arson. Each of the charges arose from actions that
Ezeta and his officers had taken in a desperate attempt to subdue the
violent revolutionary movement that eventually overthrew Ezeta's gov-
ernment. In particular, the murder charges stemmed from the execution
of four persons who had refused to defend the regime against revolution-
ary forces. The robbery charge involved funds Ezeta had stolen to pay his
troops.
Article III of the extradition treaty between Salvador and the United
States imposed no obligation to return political offenders. 30 The court,
while refusing to speculate as to Salvador's motives, denied the extradi-
tion demand. Judge Morrow reasoned from the holding of the Castioni
decision that Ezeta's actions had been in furtherance of a struggle to
maintain his government and were therefore political. 31
Two years after Ezeta the Supreme Court decided its only political
offense case. In Ornella v. Ruiz,3 2 the Mexican government demanded the
extradition of three Mexican nationals who had crossed the Mexican bor-
der from Texas with a band of armed men. The band had attacked a
small contingent of Mexican soldiers that had sought to impede its pro-
gress, and proceeded to raze and loot the village of St. Ignacio.
Mexico charged the three men with murder, kidnapping, arson, and
robbery. A federal magistrate found the accused to be extraditable. 33 On
29. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
30. The article read in relevant part: "The provisions of this treaty shall not apply to any
crime or offense of a purely political character." "Political character" was undefined. Mexico-
United States Extradition Treaty of 1862.
31. Ezeta was decided under the prior extradition statute. The statute did not expressly
authorize the judiciary to apply the political offense exception provisions that were contained
in treaties, but did provide for judicial determination of whether probable cause existed to
extradite an accused person. Ezeta held that.this probable cause hearing provision of the stat-
ute required the courts to interpret treaties and thereby empowered them to apply the political
offense exception. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
32. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
33. Id. at 503-04. The magistrate apparently was influenced in his decision by a letter from
Secretary of State Greshaw to the Mexican Foreign Minister which read in relevant part:
The idea that these acts were perpetrated with bonafide political or revolutionary designs
is negated by the fact that immediately after this occurence, though no superior armed
force of the Mexican government was in the vicinity to hinder their advance into the
country, the bandits withdrew with their booty across the river into Texas.
Id at 511.
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writ of habeas corpus, a district court reversed and held that the accused
had committed political offenses.34 The Supreme Court reinstated the
magistrate's judgment on the ground that the district court had gone be-
yond the scope of habeas review and that the magistrate's decision was
not clearly erroneous.3 5 Although the Court did not expressly rule on the
applicability of the political offense exception to the facts of the case, it
did note in dicta that the band's immediate withdrawal into Texas, de-
spite the absence of a superior Mexican force in the area, supported the
magistrate's finding. In short, the band's rampage did not rise to the
level of a political uprising.
Until Kardzole v. Artukovic36 the American judiciary had not been
presented with an opportunity to establish a clear line of demarcation
between political violence that furthers a political uprising and violence
that is merely contemporaneous with such an uprising. Unfortunately,
the Artukovic court only further obscured this distinction.
Artukovic had been Minister of the Interior of the pro-Nazi govern-
ment of Croatia during World War II. Croatia was the state entity cre-
ated in 1941 from what had been Yugoslavia. It came into being just prior
to the German invasion when the leaders of the Yugoslavian government
fled the country. The new Croation rulers exploited their position to per-
secute their historical rivals, the Serbs. Thoughout World War II, vari-
ous factions sought control of the government.
After the war, Artukovic fled to the United States and the recon-
structed Yugoslavian government sought his extradition on charges of
having ordered the execution of two hundred thousand prisoners in
Croation concentration camps. The district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California denied Yugoslavia's request and found that Artukovic
had committed political offenses as part of a political uprising.37 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 38 Writing for the court, Judge Stephens found it
significant that Artukovic had not personally killed anyone but had in-
stead ordered the executions in his official capacity. This, the judge rea-
soned, was a political offense in the context of a struggle to extablish and
34. IM at 504.
35. Id. at 508. The court instructed that the scope of habeas corpus review of an extradi-
tion magistrate's decision was limited to: (1) whether the magistrate had jurisdiction; (2)
whether the offense charged was listed as an extraditable offense in the relevant treaty; and (3)
whether there was at least legal evidence supporting the magistrate's decision. Id.
36. 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affid sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d
198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated per curiam, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), remanded sub nom. United
States ex rel Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
37. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
38. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
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maintain a government in wartime. 39 The court dismissed Yugoslavia's
argument that the executions nevertheless constituted war crimes, re-
marking only that the applicability of international proscriptions against
war crimes to the political offense exception had not been established.4°
Artukovic weakens the incidence test, and cannot be reconciled with
the historical purpose of the political offense exception. The decision ig-
nored the civilian status of the victims and failed to inquire whether mass
killings were actually necessary to maintain the Croatian governments.41
Failure to distinguish between violence that is in furtherance of, rather
than merely contemporaneous with, a political uprising transforms the
incidence test into a license for gratuitous killing.42 The trend of cases
such as Ezeta and Artukovic seems to indicate that United States courts
will lower the threshold for the application of the political offense excep-
tion for those individuals associated with a regime or government that
has fallen from power. By skewing the standards for particular groups in
this way, such an approach may jeopardize the neutrality that the polit-
ical offense exception doctrine seeks to maintain. Cases following Ar-
tukovic demonstrate a somewhat surprising application of the political
offense exception. Ramos v. Diaz43 involved the Cuban government's ex-
tradition request for two of its nationals, Diaz and Cruzata, who had
formerly served as military prison guards. The extradition request al-
leged that Diaz and Cruzata had shot and killed a prisoner as he at-
tempted to escape from a garage that served as a makeshift prison. The
incident occurred Mi" 1954, just after the fall of the Batista regime. The
new Castro government had wanted to interrogate the prisoners and had
issued a standing order mandating death to guards who failed to secure
their charges.
The court held that the political offense exception applied and denied
the Cuban extradition request. Judge Lieb observed that the killing of the
political prisoner constituted as much of a political uprising as did the
killing involved in Castioni.44 Ramos is the only American case to have
applied the political offense exception to offenders who were on the same
side of a political uprising as were those requesting extradition. Legal
realist theory might explain the decision as the result of antipathy for the
39. Id. at 204.
40. Id. at 204-06. The court believed that the existing instruments purporting to establish a
duty to surrender war criminals had not gained sufficient force of law to modify "longstanding
interpretation of similar treaty provisions." Id. at 205.
41. Id. at 204.
42. See Lubet & Czackes, supra note 6 at 205.
43. 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
44. Id. at 462-63.
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Castro regime. This explanation does not resolve the confusion Ramos
created over the criteria for determining the existence of a political
uprising.
The only cases holding the political offense exception inapplicable be-
cause of the factual nonexistence of an uprising arose in situations where
these facts were not at issue. In re Gonzalez45 held that no uprising was in
progress in the Dominican Republic when military prison guards killed
two prisoners. Similarly, Escobedo v. United States46 held two United
States nationals extraditable to Mexico for the attempted kidnapping and
murder of a Cuban consular official despite their claim that they had
planned to ransom the official for political prisoners in Cuba.47
The foregoing review of the case law illustrates that the traditional
American approach to the political offense exception has been somewhat
problematic. Comparison of Ramos and Gonzalez, where the courts
reached contradictory conclusions on very similar fact patterns, illus-
trates the lack of a consistent and principled jurisprudence. The results
suggest an approach more concerned with political needs and realities
than with a principled application of the incidence test. The search for a
more consistent jurisprudence has led to the incorporation of elements of
the Swiss predominant political motivation test.
This shift toward the Swiss approach is seen in Abu Eain,48 perhaps
the most doctrinally significant decision since Castioni. The McMullen49
and Mackins° cases address the complex issue of determining the exist-
ence of a political uprising.
In Abu Eain the accused was a Jordanian national and a member of
the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The
government of Israel sought his extradition for his alleged participation
in the bombing of a marketplace in Tiberias during a Jewish religious
festival and youth rally. Two Israeli boys died and thirty-six other per-
sons were injured in the explosion. A United States federal magistrate in
Illinois rejected Eain's claim that the act was a political offense and
45. 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
46. 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980).
47. Id at 1104. Judge Anderson instructed: "This circuit defines a political offense under
extradition as an offense committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political distur-
bance, such as war, revolution and rebellion. . . . An offense is not of a political character
simply because it was politically motivated." (citations omitted). Id.
48. In re Extradition of Ziyad Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. IIl. Dec. 18, 1979) (mem.),
habeas corpus denied sub nom, Abu Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1980), affid
sub nom. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
49. In re Extradition of McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
50. United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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found him extraditable.51 The magistrate found unpersuasive Eain's ar-
gument that the bombing of a civilian target was a relative political of-
fense in light of the PLO's long struggle to create a "democratic non-
sectarian state" in place of Israel.52
The magistrate found three areas of relevant inquiry: (1) the offender's
past participation in a political movement; (2) the existence of a connec-
tion betw-en the crime and a political objective; and (3) the proportional-
ity of the crime to the political objective.5 3 Accordingly, the magistrate
held that, although Eain had been active in an organization with clearly
defined political goals, there was no connection or proportionality be-
tween the PLO's political agenda and the use of violence against civilian
targets.5 4
Following an unsuccessful habeas corpus petition to the district
court,55 Eain appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In af-
firming the district court's disposition, Judge Woods handed down a
landmark decision,5 6 significant both for its defense of judicial compe-
tence to decide political offense questions and for its substantive contri-
bution to the analysis of these questions.
The government argued that the courts could not apply the political
offense exception because such inquiries present political questions and
also because the terms of the United States-Israel extradition treaty5 7 re-
quire the Executive Branch to apply the exception. In addition, the gov-
ernment suggested that it was irrational for the courts to decide whether
particular acts constitute political offenses while not inquiring into the
motives of a state requesting extradition. Judge Wood rejected both ar-
guments.58 Determination of the applicability of the political offense ex-
ception does not, as the government argued, require "an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 59 On the con-
trary, Judge Wood reasoned, a judge may determine the applicability of
the exception through objective findings of past fact, such as whether a
violent controversy existed at the time an act was perpetrated. Though
51. In re Extradition of Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. I. Dec. 18, 1979) (mem.)
52. Id. at 12-13.
53. Id at 19-21.
54. Id
55. Abu Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. In. 1980).
56. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
57. 14 U.S.T. 1707, Art. VI(4) (1963).
58. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 513-14.
59. Id. Judge Wood remarked:
The existence of a violent political disturbance is an issue of past fact: either there was
demonstrable, violent activity tied to political causes or there was not.
Id
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the State Department may possess a superior ability to gather informa-
tion regarding the intensity of foreign political disturbances, it can read-
ily share such information with the courts through in camera review
procedures. Hence, there need be no embarrassment to the executive in
the exercise of foreign policy because the executive may consult with the
court and because the court's inquiry is limited to factual matters.
Judge Wood also disagreed with the government's interpretation of the
United States-Israel extradition treaty as placing the political offense is-
sue within the exclusive purview of the executive. The judge found that
judicial construction of extradition treaties had long been a major proce-
dural safeguard for accused persons and that there was little indication
that the drafters of the treaty had intended to withdraw that protectionA°
Finally, Judge Wood distinguished the question of whether an act consti-
tutes a political offense from the characterization of a state's motivation
in demanding extradition. The latter function calls for policy determina-
tions that are clearly inappropriate for courts, and it is therefore not sur-
prising that courts follow the rule of noninquiry. 61
Having established its competence to consider the issue, the court pro-
ceeded to discuss the appropriate test for applying the political offense
exception. Initially, Judge Wood questioned the magistrate's implicit as-
sumption that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute constituted a political upris-
ing.62 It was far from obvious, in the court's view, that the traditional
conception of a political uprising could be extended to the Israeli-Pales-
tinian dispute, inasmuch as the PLO's tactics were more terrorist than
conventional. 63 It was, however, unnecessary to decide the issue because
the magistrate had properly ruled that there was no connection or pro-
portionality between the killing and maiming of civilians and the PLO's
political goals. In reviewing this conclusion, Judge Wood used the lan-
60. Judge Wood said:
[O]ne constant in American extradition law is that the magistrate is to make the initial
determination in the extradition process. We hesitate to hold on so slim a record as is
available on the intent of the drafters of the Treaty in this case that the major procedural
safeguards established to protect the defendant's rights have been deliberately written out
of the document.
Id at 518, quoting Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D.D.C. 1979).
61. Id. at 516.
62. Id at 519.
63. Id Judge Wood remarked:
The nature of that [Israel-P.L.O.] conflict is somewhat different than disturbances that
have been considered in other cases where resistance to extradition on grounds of a polit-
ical offense exception have been sustained. Those cases involved on-going, organized bat-
tles between contending armies.




guage of the traditional incidence test,64 but did not end the analysis
there. He went on to note that indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets
are really directed at the social, not the political, structure.65 Such ran-
dom violence can never, the court concluded, advance a political cause. 66
Abu Eain is a decision of great doctrinal importance. It refines the
incidence test and incorporates the proportionality approach of the Swiss
courts. Subsequent cases follow Abu Eain in refusing to apply the polit-
ical offense exception to violence against civilians. However, the case did
not settle the question of what scale of violence or degree of discontent
might constitute a political uprising.
The McMullen67 case, a decision contemporaneous with Abu Eain,
concerned the United Kingdom's extradition request for Peter McMul-
len. The request alleged that McMullen had participated in the 1972
bombing of a British army barracks in North Yorkshire, England. Mc-
Mullen had had a history of involvement with the Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army (PIRA) , beginning in 1972, after his desertion from the
British army. In 1974, McMullen had been convicted by an Irish court of
membership in the PIRA and of carrying firearms. He was sentenced to
three years in prison. Following his release, the PIRA sought to recruit
McMullen for further service, and threatened reprisals when he declined.
McMullen escaped to the United States in 1978 and was arrested for car-
rying a false passport. Scotland Yard detectives were allowed to question
him, and he provided information about his participation in past PIRA
activities. Thereafter, the United Kingdom demanded his extradition.
A federal magistrate in the Northern District of California applied the
political offense exception and found McMullen nonextraditable. 68 Two
aspects of the decision are important. First, the magistrate found that a
political uprising had existed in Northern Ireland during 1972.69 This
conclusion was based on the PIRA's longstanding goals of independence
from Ulster, the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland, the ter-
mination of home rule, and the history of political violence in the region.
64. Abu Eain, 641 F.2d at 520.
65. The definition of "political disturbance", with its focus on organized forms of ag-
gression such as war, rebellion and revolution, is aimed at acts that disrupt the political
structure of a State, and not the social structure.
Id
66. Id. at 521.
67. In re Extradition of McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
68. Id at 4.
69. Id at 6. U.S. Magistrate Frederick J. Woefler said:
[McMullen] acted as a member of PIRA, his activities were directed by persons in author-
ity in the PIRA, and the bombing was a crime incidental to and formed as a part of a
political disturbance, uprising or insurrection and in furtherance thereof.
Id.
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Second, the magistrate applied the second half of the Castioni test to find
that the bombing had been incidental to the PIRA's political objectives.
McMullen70 was the first decision to advance criteria for determining
whether a political uprising exists. It conducts a contextual analysis in an
attempt to determine what political claims have been asserted within the
demanding state and what political struggles or disturbances have re-
sulted from the attempted assertion of these claims.
Development of this approach was continued in another case that in-
volved the British and the PIRA, In re Mackin.71 Desmond Mackin was
a member of the PIRA whom the United Kingdom accused of wounding
a British soldier in a 1978 gunfight between PIRA members and British
troops in Belfast.72 A federal magistrate in the Southern District of New
York denied the United Kingdom's extradition demand on the ground
that Mackin's action constituted a political offense.73 The magistrate
found that the PIRA had been conducting an uprising in Belfast at the
time of the shooting and that Mackin's action was incidental to that
uprising.
The United States brought an appeal and, in the alternative, a request
for mandamus in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Friendly
held that the U.S. international extradition statute74 did not permit the
government to appeal from a finding of nonextraditability, 75 and that
mandamus was inappropriate because the magistrate's disposition was
clearly within her jurisdiction. The opinion does not explicitly address
how political offenses should be analyzed, but does consider the govern-
ment's argument that the extradition treaty between the United States
and Britain vested sole competence to consider the political offense ex-
ception in the executive.76 Judge Friendly first approached the issue in a
70. The Immigration and Naturalization Service subsequently attempted to deport Mc-
Mullen to Northern Ireland. McMullen claimed that his deportation would violate § 243(h) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254, which forbids the deportation of
persons likely to suffer political persecution. McMullen's claim was based on the assertion that
the authorities in Ireland could not prevent the PIRA from harming him. The district court
for the Northern District of California agreed and disallowed his deportation. McMullen v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 278-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. 1980), afl'd 658 F.2d
1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
71. Supra note 50.
72. The extradition request by Britain and Northern Ireland charged Mackin with at-
tempted murder, wounding a soldier with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and illegal posses-
sion of firearms.
73. Supra note 50 at 124-25.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
75. Supra note 50 at 125-30.
76. 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. 8468. Art. V(1)(c)(i) of the treaty provides:
Extradition shall not be granted if:. . . the offense for which extradition is requested is




manner similar to that of Judge Wood in the Abu Eain case, noting that
there had been no showing that the drafters of the treaty had intended to
deviate from the longstanding provision for judicial scrutiny of political
offense claims.77 Judge Friendly then examined the history of U.S. inter-
national extradition statutes and found that Congress had always con-
templated an initial determination of the political offense issue by the
judiciary.78
The foregoing review indicates that the recent political offense excep-
tion cases are significant for two reasons. First, the courts that have con-
fronted the issue have declined to alter the existing allocation of
competence between the judiciary and the executive.79 Neither the Abu
Eain nor the Mackin courts found the political question doctrine to be a
constitutional impediment to judicial consideration. In addition, neither
court would interpret the extradition treaty before it in a manner that
would limit its jurisdiction. Thus, it appears that the policies underlying
the provision of procedural safeguards can only be disavowed through an
express act of Congress.
Second, the cases reformulate the traditional incidence test. Abu Eain
set forth a contextual examination of the act at issue to determine
whether it could have furthered a political goal. This establishes a trend
The government interpreted the term "requested Party" to refer only to the executive.
77. Judge Friendly noted that, in enacting America's first extradition statute, the Extradi-
tion Act of 1848, Congress explicitly provided for a judicial hearing to determine whether an
extradition charge could be supported by the evidence. The Judge further noted that Congress
had been shocked by the extradition without judicial process of Jonathan Robbins to Britain
for what appeared to be political offenses and intended to erect safeguards against similar
occurrences. Id. at 134-35.
78. The current United States statute concerning international extradition, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184, allows the representatives of a foreign nation with which an extradition treaty is in
force to request the return of a fugitive by presenting a copy of the foreign complaint, together
with affidavits and other supporting materials, to a federal or state magistrate in the district
where the accused is believed to be present. The modern trend is for the foreign government to
submit the request for extradition and supporting materials to the State Department, which,
after evaluation, forwards the papers to the United States Attorney in the district where the
person sought to be extradited may be found. The United States Attorney then fies the com-
plaint, seeks an arrest warrant from the magistrate, and argues on behalf of the requesting
state. While the scope of the hearing before the magistrate is limited to determining whether
the claimed offense is within the applicable treaty, the magistrate must also consider the appli-
cability of the political offense exception as specified in the treaty. Should the magistrate find
that he cannot certify the matter to the Secretary of State for extradition, the judgment is final,
and neither the requesting foreign government nor the Secretary of State may take a direct
appeal from the magistrate's decision. However, should the magistrate find the person extra-
ditable, the Secretary retains the right to overturn that finding if the Secretary determines that
the requesting state seeks to punish the accused for a political offense rather than for common
crimes. See Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public Order,
36 TENN. L. REv. 1, 27 (1968); Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1313, 1316 (1962).
79. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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away from the application of the political offense exception, as seen in
cases like Artukovic, and suggests that courts should consider the target
and means to determine whether the violent acts were reasonably related
and proportional to a group's political ends. Furthermore, the McMullen
case departed from prior case law in its attempt to assess the PIRA's
political goals in light of claims being made by other groups in the larger
society.
Despite these significant refinements made in the recent cases, the inci-
dence test remains an incomplete analytical framework for application of
the political offense exception in the context of modem political violence.
The analysis must move beyond McMullen and Mackin to define a polit-
ical uprising so that courts can apply the standards of proportionality
and reasonableness in determining whether the actions under considera-
tion are reasonably related to achieving the goals of such a political up-
rising. Such a clarification is necessary, because, as McMullen and
Mackin demonstrate, cases will inevitably arise where decisions cannot
be based solely on the status of the targets of violence. The problems
inherent in this approach are illustrated by French efforts to develop an
"objective test" based on the nature of the targets of violence.
V. The Objective Test in French Law
Precise statement of the French approach is difficult because the juris-
prudence has been inconsistent and often has appeared to attach determi-
native significance to foreign policy imperatives, to the exclusion of the
other interests implicated in the political offense exception. Nevertheless,
the approach is commonly described as following an "objective test" that
directs inquiry to the character of the target of an act for which extradi-
tion is sought. Only acts that impact solely on a government are sup-
posed to be political offenses.
The leading case defining the objective test is In re Giovanni Gatti. 0
Gatti was a national of the Republic of San Marino who had been sen-
tenced in that country to a twelve-year prison term for the attempted
murder of a communist. Gatti sought to defend against extradition to
San Marino through a demonstration that his acts had been politically
motivated. Though the French international extradition statute appeared
broad enough to forbid extradition for political offenses,81 the Cour
80. 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Cour d'appel, Grenoble 1947).




d'appel did not inquire into the circumstances surrounding the incident8 2
or into Gatti's subjective motivation. The Cour d'appel instead limited its
inquiry to whether the act had impacted exclusively on the rights of the
state.83
Gatti is anathema to the legislative intent behind the French interna-
tional extradition statute because the statute was intended to mandate
scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding an act and of the perpetrator's
subjective motivation.84 Indeed the language of the act itself directs in-
quiry not only into the relevant circumstances and the perpetrator's sub-
jective motivation, but also into the motivation of the requesting
government. Yet, the decision appears to recognize a political offense ex-
ception only for nonviolent, purely political offenses, since relative polit-
ical offenses inevitably injure people or property rather than only
abstract rights of the state.85
In the period immediately following Gatti, the French courts signfi-
cantly broadened the scope of the objective test. This trend began with
In re Rodriguez,86 in which the Cour d'appel of Paris refused the Spanish
government's demand for the extradition of two of its nationals who had
been members of a movement that sought to overthrow the Spanish gov-
ernment and whom it charged with arson and murder. Similarly, in In re
[Extradition is not granted] when the crime or offense has a political character or when
it is clear (resulte) from the circumstances that the extradition is requested for a political
end.
As to acts committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war by one or the other
of the parties engaged in the conflict and in the furtherance. . . of its purpose, they may
not be grounds for extradition unless they constitute acts of odious barbarism and vandal-
ism prohibited by the laws of war, and only when the civil war has ended.
Id. at title I, art. 5, para. 2, in Harvard Research 380-81, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 380 (1935) (unoffi-
cial translation).
82. Had the Cour d'appel engaged in such an inquiry, it would have found that no immedi-
ate and large-scale political conflict existed at the time of the incident.
83. The Cour d'appel announced:
Political offenses are those which injure the political organism, which are directed against
the constitution of the government and against sovereignty, which trouble the order estab-
lished by the fundamental laws of the state and disturb the distribution of pow-
ers. . . .What distinguishes the political crime from the common crime is the fact that
the former only affects the political organization of the state, the proper rights of the state,
while the latter exclusively affects rights other than those of the state. The fact that the
reasons of sentiment which prompted the offender to commit the offense belong to the
realm of politics does not itself create a political offense. The offense does not derive its
political character from the motive of the offender but from the nature of the rights it
injures.
14 Ann. Dig. 145, 145-46 (Cour d'appel, Grenoble 1947).
84. Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infraction? An Appraisal of Recent
French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 265, 275-76 (1980).
85. See, Garcia-Mora, supra note 22 at 1250.
86. 2 GAz. PALAIS 113 (Cour d'appel, Paris, 1953).
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Hennin8 7 the Cour d'appel of Paris rejected the Swiss government's de-
mand for a Swiss national charged with arson against private property on
the ground that the accused had committed the offense in a heated polit-
ical climate.
Though the trend away from the formalism of the objective test facili-
tated consideration of the context of political violence, it failed to pro-
duce an analytical framework. The courts simply announced their
conclusions without attempting to identify the dispositive characteristics
of a relative political offense. It is thus not surprising that the phenome-
non of modern terrorism has prompted movement towards an objective
test that is once again formalistic.
The first notable French case that concerned modern terrorism was In
re Abu Daoud.88 The case involved West German and Israeli extradition
requests for Abu Daoud, the reputed organizer of the 1972 massacre of
members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich. After Daoud's provi-
sional arrest in France, he was released to Algiers and the extradition
was denied on the ground of technical insufficiencies in the two extradi-
tion requests. West Germany's request was found insufficient because the
West German arrest warrant had not been processed through proper dip-
lomatic channels. Israel's request was insufficient because Daoud had not
been charged with a crime within the scope of the France-Israel extradi-
tion treaty.
It has been suggested that the Cour d'appel's disposition of the case
was preordained by the court's fear that holding Daoud might jeopardize
a pending oil deal between France and Saudi Arabia and a defense supply
contract being negotiated between France and Egypt.8 9
The Klaus Croissant90 case marks the beginning of the French judici-
ary's attempt to establish a more principled, albeit still inflexible, juris-
prudence. The case concerned West Germany's demand for a West
German national who was the former attorney for operations in the
Baader-Meinhof group. Croissant was charged with passing information
between at large and imprisoned members of the Baader-Meinhof group
while propagandizing on the group's behalf and participating in direct
terrorist attacks.91 The court found that there was insufficient evidence
to link Croissant with any terrorist attack and declared that propa-
gandizing was not a basis for extradition under the France-West Ger-
87. JURIS-CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE (J.C.P. II) No. 15274 (Cour d'appel, Paris, 1967).
88. 104 J. DR. INT'L 843 (Cour d'appel, Paris 1977).
89. See Carbonneau, supra note 84, at 284-86.
90. The decision of the Cour d'appel of Paris was not officially reported. For a journalistic
account, see Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3.




many extradition treaty. The court did, however, grant extradition on the
basis of the first charge which it found to constitute a common crime.
Though Klaus Croissant circumvented the most difficult issues on tech-
nical grounds, it does represent a significant development in French juris-
prudence. The refusal to hold that Croissant's claimed political
motivation transformed an otherwise common crime into a relative polit-
ical offense may be seen to represent a return to the Giovanni Gatti for-
mulation of the objective test.
This trend was continued in the Piperno92 case. In Piperno the Italian
government demanded the extradition of Franceso Piperno for his al-
leged participation in the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro. The
requisition charged that Piperno had been involved in the incident while
a member of the Red Brigade. The French court held that irrespective of
political motivation, no political character can be ascribed to an act such
as murder because of its seriousness. 93
Thus the French judiciary has come full circle and seriously under-
mined the relative political offense exception in its efforts to deal with
modern political violence. It remains unclear whether the French courts
will refuse to apply the exception under any circumstances or whether
the exception will cease to exist as a legitimate doctrine of law. The
French response underscores the importance of developing criteria for
distinguishing between terrorism and rebellion. Without such a distinc-
tion, maintenance of both the extradition system and the political offense
exception will prove impossible.
VI. Issues in the Jurisprudence of the Political Offense Exception
General dissatisfaction with the case law has led to numerous schol-
arly and legislative proposals for change. Each of these proposals ad-
92. For an account of the case, see Id. at 291-96.
93. Carbonneau takes the position that Klaus Croissant and PFperno together represent
movement towards that portion of the Swiss approach to the political offense exception that
inquires into the proportionality between the asserted political goal and the means used to
reach that goal. Using this analysis, Carbonneau's findings lead to the conclusion that terrorist
violence can never be the basis of application of the exception since this violence rarely ad-
vances a legitimate political cause. Unfortunately, the commentator does not make clear how
terrorism and rebellion are to be distinguished, except to suggest that certain very "serious"
acts should never be considered political offenses. Carbonneau, supra note 84, at 290-97. This
is essentially the approach taken in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
Jan 27, 1977, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 233 (1977).
The problem with this approach is-that many political uprisings do involve the use of fire-
arms and killing. Carbonneau's approach, then, could lead to extinction of the political offense
exception for all but pure political offenses or those relative political offenses that involve only
property crimes.
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dresses a facet of the problem, but none deals directly with the core issue
of distinguishing a political offense from terrorism.
The most sweeping proposal is also the most facile: elimination of the
political offense exception from extradition treaties.94 The Secretary of
State would, instead, use his discretion in granting requests for political
asylum.95 This political method faces no legal impediments, but it does
raise questions as to its utility in the conduct of foreign policy, as well as
questions of fairness to the person seeking asylum. This proposal would
make it impossible for the United States to be or to appear neutral in any
foreign controversy once a participant reached the United States and re-
quested asylum. The decision would turn solely on the Secretary's assess-
ment of the short-term political implications of his response. The
Secretary would be forced to appear to have taken a position on a foreign
political controversy.
Proposals to retain the political offense exception but to vest exclusive
competence to apply it in the Secretary of State raise similar objections. 96
This approach rests on the assumption that the political offense exception
is anachronistic and that the rights of the individual should be ignored in
the interest of foreign policy goals of the United States.
Proposals to retain the political offense exception and to continue to
vest competence in the judiciary to apply the political offense exception
preserve the neutrality goal. These proposals differ in the degree of lati-
tude permitted the judiciary and the means chosen to constrain that lati-
tude. The greatest constraint would take the form of Congressionally
mandated exclusions. 97 Such an approach has been suggested by Con-
gress in recent legislative proposals. 98 Under this approach, Congress
94. See, eg., Epps, The Validity of the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Treaties in
Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARv. INT'L L. J. 61, 82-83 (1979) (political offense case
law explicable only in political terms; accused individual's rights adequately protected through
the executive's authority to grant political asylum).
95. American extradition treaties do not designate the branch of government which is to
apply the political offense exception.
96. See, e.g., Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offense Exception: An Adminis-
trative Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 178-83 (1981) (political offense exception protects
rights of accused but should be implemented through State Department hearings).
97. S. 1639, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The bill was introduced by Senator Thurmond.
It provides that the courts may only consider whether the offense charged is on the list of
extraditable offenses under the applicable treaty and whether probable cause exists to believe
that the accused is guilty. Id at § 3194. On these issues, a court's decision would be an appeal-
able final judgment. Upon exhaustion of appeal from a finding of extraditablity, the Secretary
of State would determine the applicability of the political offense exception and thereby fulfill
the treaty obligations of the United States. Id at § 3196.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee failed to approve S.1639, citing the historical pur-
pose of the political offense exception and the important role of judicial processes in ensuring
fair and impartial consideration.
98. S.1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 0982).
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would specify particular types of conduct that could never be adjudged
by a court to be a political offense.99 The European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism takes this approach.l °°
A middle level of constraint would have Congress set guidelines that
would substantially narrow the relative political offense exception. 01 The
guidelines would divide actions into per se exclusions from the political
offense exception and actions that would qualify as political offenses
only if committed under "extraordinary circumstances."' 10 2
Both of these approaches would make hijacking, for example, aper se
exclusion. The distinction between the two would depend on how
broadly or narrowly either Congress or the courts defined "extraordinary
circumstances" and whether any meaningful distinction could be made
under this rubric given the violent nature of so many political offenses.
The most important criticism of these approaches is that they attempt to
create automatic categories for actions taken in very different contexts
with different motives and different consequences.
The least restrictive alternative involves placing the burden of produc-
tion and the burden of persuasion on the person seeking to invoke the
political offense exception in an extradition hearing.' 0 3 This proposal has
the merit of clarifying what is now a confusing situation with no consis-
tent precedents in the case law. The proposal also seems to recognize that
the person involved will have the best access to information linking him
to a political struggle. However, the problem of distinguishing between a
political offense and terrorism remains.
A final proposal would remove the issue from national competence
and have all extradition requests decided by an international juristic tri-
bunal such as the International Court of Justice. Proponents argue that
an international tribunal could operate more objectively than a municipal
99. Id at § 1396.
100. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 93.
101. S.1940, supra note 98 incorporates this approach.
102. The bill would have required the individual seeking to invoke the political offense
exception to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances by clear and convincing
evidence. More is involved than a shift in the burden of proof. For while use of the term
"extraordinary circumstances" appears to invite particularized justice, the Report of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee indicates that the term is much narrower than the traditional
incidence test. "Extraordinary circumstances" refers only to situations where the accused had
first attempted to exercise non-violent civil or political rights and was then forced to resort to
violence as a means of self-defense. Though expansive judicial interpretation of the definition
of an attempt to exercise civil or political rights and of forced resort to violence would be
possible, the more likely result would be per se inapplicability of the political offense exception
to any form of guerilla warfare.
103. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in Ex-
tradition - A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217
(1969).
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tribunal. In addition, an international tribunal would be more concerned
with balancing the interests of individual states against the standard of
international equity and order than with the momentary interests of any
one nation. 104 However, individual nations would retain the right to
grant political asylum and thus the possibility of international friction
would remain. Indeed, it is conceivable that a state's decision to grant
asylum could spark even greater friction when it is taken despite the pro-
nouncement of an international tribunal.
These proposals fail either to solve or to provide an alternative to the
problem of defining a political offense in a way that distinguishes it from
terrorism.
VII. Toward a Functional Test for the Existence of a Political
Uprising
Cases will inevitably arise in which terrorism and rebellion cannot be
distinguished except through clarification of the term "political upris-
ing." The immediate task is to develop an analytical framework that
facilitates this distinction and that reconciles the fundamental purpose of
extradition, the return of criminal suspects to justice, with the purpose of
the political offense exception, the preservation of neutrality in foreign
relations. Toward this end, this article proposes adoption of a "functional
test," consisting of a three-stage analysis, for determining the existence of
a political uprising. 105
104. For a discussion of the importance of this consideration in international decision
maing, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUB-
LIC ORDER 83 (1982).
105. The purpose of a functional test should be to distinguish between the two ubiquitous
forms of modem political violence - "terrorism" and politically-based guerrilla warfare - so
that the former falls outside and the latter within the political offense exception. Contrary to
the admonition that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, it is possible to make
the distinction in a functional rather than a normative manner.
See, e.g., M. STOL, THE PoLrrIcs OF TERRORISM, chapter 4 (1979) for the argument that
one characteristic of terrorism is that terrorist movements enjoy little popular support among
the citizenry and control insufficient resources to win outright political or military victory.
Terrorist movements attempt to undermine governmental authority through clandestine and
sporadic operations against the social structure of a society. Terrorist tactics may be designed
to demonstrate the government's inability to maintain order, discourage high visibility service
in the government, provoke indiscriminate governmental repression in hopes of stimulating
discontent, disrupt the economy, publicize a message, or otherwise create instability.
This is not to suggest that any movement that does not neatly fit the pattern of terrorism
should necessarily be considered a rebellion or political uprising. Recognition of the essential
characteristics of terrorism does, however, underscore the need to assess the relation between





The first stage is familiar and directs inquiry into the offender's polit-
ical objectives. The court should identify the cause for which the accused
purports to have acted and determine whether he acted as a member of
an organization seeking to advance that cause. The court should then
appraise whether the movement is fundamentally incompatible with
either the system of government within the requesting state (or with the
leadership), and whether the movement seeks to seize political control of
the state. Only claims to assume political control of the state or claims to
self-determination should be considered adequate to support the finding
that a political uprising exists.
Stage II.
The second stage asks whether a concordance or identity exists be-
tween the cause of a revolutionary organization and claims consistently
asserted by larger societal elements. A "larger societal element" is an
ethnically, religiously, demographically, economically, or culturally rec-
ognizable and cohesive interest group that is a significant participant in
the shaping and sharing of values within the society. The relevant ques-
tion at this stage is not how many but who asserts the claim.
Although the tendency of recent decisions is to place the burden of
proof on the accused to establish the elements of the political offense
exception, judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist to
guide the courts in appraising the accused's efforts to identify these socie-
tal elements and to explain their claims. Evidence of a clear international
consensus regarding the claims and representative status of parties to the
conflict should be considered relevant when two conditions are satisfied:
first, the consensus pertains not merely to an abstract norm but to the
particular conflict at issue; and second, the consensus is expressed either
in binding international law or by bodies, such as the United Nations
General Assembly, that are highly representative of the world
community.
In the absence of a clear international consensus, judges' impartiality
in evaluating the evidence will be of paramount importance. The parties
may offer evidence pertaining to cultural and historical antecedents of
the conflict and to the level of cooperation between the revolutionary
organization and the larger societal elements. The State Department's
analysis might be represented in camera and political scientists and for-
eign correspondents can serve as expert witnesses.
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Stage IML
The third stage inquires whether the larger societal elements with
whom the accused and his organization identify may reasonably be said
to endorse or condone the use of force to achieve their goals. Such an
inquiry is necessary because, even though larger societal elements may
share the ultimate goal of a revolutionary organization, they may pursue
alternative strategies, such as negotiation, for implementation. Inevita-
bly, this inquiry must resort to circumstantial evidence and common
sense. Several factors might be considered. First, the nature of the
claim: is the claim so antithetical to the status quo that force is the most
likely strategy? Second, the history of the conflict that the claim under-
lies: has there been movement and reconciliation, or is there a clear pat-
tern of retrenchment and conflict? Has the government made political
prisoners out of the revolutionary leadership? Third, the history of vio-
lence attending the political conflict: has the governmental response to
the assertion of the claim been violent? Have nonviolent activities such as
strikes or demonstrations been permitted? Has there been a discernible
escalation in the level of violence? Have other independent paramilitary
groups sprung up?
There is unavoidable difficulty in answering these questions. Ulti-
mately, the functional test is an analytical framework rather than a set of
rigid rules. It offers an approach for thinking about the issues raised in
determining the existence of a political uprising and for resolving these
issues in a manner consistent with the policies behind international extra-
dition. The approach is useful to the extent that it facilitates organiza-
tion and comprehension of the facts of a particular conflict. However, it
must be emphasized that the functional test is not the end of the political
offense inquiry. Even assuming the existence of a political uprising, the
Swiss test for determining whether a violent act was necessary or propor-
tional to the goals of a revolutionary movement must be applied. Fi-
nally, courts should recognize that, in extraordinary cases, any
formulation of the political offense exception must defer to compelling
foreign policy concerns.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the political offense exception is not an
outdated relic of a simpler age. Neutrality in foreign rebellions, to the
extent of refusing to deliver belligerents into the hands of their enemies,
remains sound policy in the contemporary world community. The polit-
ical offense exception does not require a determination of which party in




international extradition as a mechanism to bring common criminals to
justice. Judicial involvement inhibits political manipulation of the mech-
anism and affords a measure of procedural fairness to the accused. This
involvement has had no discernable adverse effect on the conduct of
United States foreign policy. Therefore, the difficulty in dealing with
modern political violence does not call for sweeping change, but can be
solved through development of the existing jurisprudential approach.
The functional approach recognizes the necessity of refining the polit-
ical uprising component of the incidence test. There is no other way to
distinguish rebellion from terrorism. The functional test suggested here
would require an examination of the goals of a revolutionary organiza-
tion and of the place of those goals within the larger society. Such an
exercise is not normative, but functional, and does not imply approval or
disapproval.
In the final analysis, adoption of a functional test will depend on the
ability of the courts to develop the analytical framework to assess realisti-
cally the concordance between the goals of a revolutionary movement
and the claims asserted in the larger society. This is no simple task since
the assessment must adhere to evidentiary norms. The framework sug-
gested in this article may provide a useful starting place, but the actual
development awaits courageous and innovative representation by practi-
tioners and similarly creative balancing of considerations by judges.

